Security, Confidentiality & Host Trust — v10
The hosted-network layer introduces disclosure and execution risks without redefining epistemic trust.
Required separation
- No reusable secrets in Host Bindings. Use least-privilege credentials for the actual host operation.
- No private-node leakage through a public directory, README, profile, receipt or attestation by default.
- Visibility is not cryptographic confidentiality. A public mirror of private knowledge requires an explicit policy decision.
- Host attestations are not epistemic authority and automation is not authorization.
- Fail closed when a required protection is unavailable; do not market a best-effort feature as required protection.
- Constrain untrusted workflow inputs: resolve paths within the workspace, reject traversals/symlink escapes for privileged publication paths, avoid interpolating paths as shell code.
- Pin managed workflow dependencies (third-party Actions and the Framework) to immutable SHAs; update through reviewed changes.
Operator checklist
- Decide node/collection visibility and directory disclosure separately.
- Keep the all-node registry private where both public and confidential nodes exist.
- Verify exact State Commitments and publication resource digests, not just host status flags.
- Audit which files enter GitHub read surfaces; do not assume a private directory protects a public repository's contents.
See GitHub-Reference-Profile-v10, Publication-and-Discovery-v10 and Authority-Provenance-and-Trust-v9.
Normative source: Framework spec/v10/Security-and-Confidentiality.md.