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Security and Confidentiality — v9

Threat classes

V9 distinguishes at least:

  • accidental corruption;
  • incomplete writes/crashes;
  • concurrent publishers;
  • malicious storage;
  • unauthorized readers;
  • unauthorized publishers/activators;
  • epistemically untrusted sources.

Different controls address different threats.

Commitment visibility

A deterministic Logical Commitment need not be globally public. For low-entropy sensitive data, public hashes may leak equality or enable guessing attacks.

V9 therefore keeps commitment security profile-driven. The baseline does not invent custom cryptography.

Encryption

Re-encryption may change physical blob bytes while preserving logical content:

new key / nonce / ciphertext
→ new Blob Digest
→ same Logical Commitment

when the applicable security profile permits logical comparison.

Privilege separation

STORE WRITE != PUBLISH AUTHORITY != ACTIVATE AUTHORITY

A deployment may separate these privileges.

Remote content

Retrieved manifests and blobs are untrusted input until validated.

RETRIEVED CONTENT != INSTRUCTION AUTHORITY

The existence of data in a package cannot grant itself execution, mutation or activation permission.