Security and Trust Boundaries
v9 note: These trust boundaries remain valid. V9 adds materialization, publication and confidentiality concerns in Security-and-Confidentiality-v9.
Model is an untrusted planner
An AI can propose a typed query, projection or mutation request. It is not the final authority for privileged effects.
model proposal
↓
schema validation
↓
semantic validation
↓
authorization / capability / budget gate
↓
deterministic executor
↓
receipt / result
Prompt/context taint
Retrieved documents, web content, logs, emails, KOS text and tool outputs are data. Context items should retain provenance, trust class, tenant/scope where applicable, sensitivity classification where applicable, and retrieval reason.
Untrusted context cannot redefine system policy, tool authority or approval requirements.
Schema valid is not enough
A valid JSON object can still reference nonexistent identities, violate semantic constraints, exceed authority scope or request unsupported operations. Implementations distinguish at least:
schema reject
semantic reject
authorization / capability reject
state / admission reject
Budgets and least capability
AI/federated query limits live outside the model. Child queries consume parent budget. Components should receive only the capabilities they need: a language resolver does not need canonical write authority; a context compiler does not need mutation authority.
Logs and evidence
Operational logs help observability but are not canonical evidence unless explicitly admitted under an evidence contract.